A series of recent, seminal papers have greatly advanced our understanding of bubbles by modeling greater fool's bubbles, where rational but asymmetrically informed investors buy overvalued assets hoping to sell at a profit before the crash. The authors of these papers note that some assumptions made to keep prices from revealing private information may be controversial. Prices are either assumed to be unresponsive to sales, which is difficult to justify, or prices must satisfy certain parameter restrictions exactly, which makes bubbles fragile. To avoid these critiques, I add multidimensional uncertainty, so that price movements due to investors' sales can be mistaken for random day-to-day fluctuations. Temporary confusion allows some investors to sell before the crash, allowing bubbles of arbitrary duration to arise. Thus, my paper supports and advances previous contributions by introducing noisy prices in a tractable way and generating bubbles that are robust to the aforementioned critiques.
Introduction
The perception that bubbles can inflate asset prices beyond their fundamental values appears to be widespread among financial market participants and policymakers alike. For instance, central bankers Greenspan (1996) , Bernanke (2002) and Trichet (2005) have given speeches about monetary policy in the presence of bubbles, and famed investor Warren Buffett (2001 Buffett ( , 2005 has, in different contexts, expressed the view that prices were "out of line" with fundamentals.
2 On the other hand, the idea of bubbles has proven very difficult to reconcile with rigorous economic theory, and this has led many economists to be skeptical about bubbles, and to favor fundamentals-based asset pricing.
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Standard asset pricing theory is based on the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama (1965) ), by which prices reflect all public information about fundamentals, thus ruling out bubbles. Proponents of fundamentals-based asset pricing point out that even in episodes widely cited as bubbles, like the Dutch Tulipmania (1634-1637), the Mississippi Bubble (1719-1720) and the South Sea Bubble (1720), fundamentals-based interpretations cannot be ruled out (see Garber (2001) ). Furthermore, Santos and Woodford (2000) show that, in models with rational agents and symmetric information, bubble-equilibria are fragile and depend on special assumptions. In environments with asymmetric information, no-trade theorems (Milgrom and Stokey (1982) ) rule out bubbles in a wide class of environments.
However, a series of recent papers have supported view that bubbles are relevant. For example, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) document that, in the late 1990s, hedge funds invested heavily in tech stocks, knowing that they were overvalued. Still, many funds succeeded in timing the market, earning large returns for a while, and selling before the crash. There is also a strand of literature (see Lei, Plott, and Noisure (2001) ) documenting that, in experimental settings, bubbles are very pervasive.
Moreover, recent models of bubbles have become increasingly compatible with standard economic theory. A particularly influential line of research includes Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) (AB henceforth), Allen, et al. (1993), and Conlon (2004) . In these models, asymmetric information deactivates the backward induction mechanism that typically precludes bubbles in other environments. The key idea is that of a "greater fool's bubble", by which it is rational to be a fool and invest in an overvalued asset, as long as there is a good chance of finding a greater fool who will pay even more later. 4 Investors chase profits understanding that they may end up being the greater fool, unable to sell before the crash. In AB, rational agents hold a rapidly appreciating asset, and at some point, observe a private signal revealing that it is overvalued. Importantly, they do not know when others observe the signal. In equilibrium, some sell before the crash and make profits, and others suffer losses. Still, the probability of being in the former group and the growth rate of the bubble are high enough to entice agents to take their chances and knowingly hold an overpriced asset. While details differ in Allen et al. (1993) and Conlon (2004) , the core ideas are similar. Asymmetrically informed, rational agents know there is a bubble, but want to ride it, because expected profit is positive.
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But the authors of these seminal papers note that the assumptions they make to prevent prices from fully revealing private information may be controversial. Allen et al. (1993) and Conlon (2004) assume that parameters, such as the probabilities of different states of the world and dividends at those states, satisfy exact proportions. A small change in one parameter, holding others constant, makes bubbles collapse. 6 In AB, bubbles are robust to small changes in parameters, but prices are, to some extent, independent of selling 4 Other approaches to modeling bubbles include, among others, bubbles that may last indefinitely in expected value (Blanchard and Watson (1982) ), overconfidence (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) ), noise agent risk (Delong, et al (1990) ), and asymmetric information with call-option-type compensation for fund managers (Allen and Gorton (1993) ). For a survey, see Brunnermeier (2001) . 5 In reality, fund managers who stay out of bubbles post lower returns than their peers and, unless they have a Buffett-like reputation, lose customers and/or face pressure to resign. Managers who actively bet against bubbles can have disastrous results, as illustrated by the bloomberg.com story on fund manager Michael Berger, who bought put options on dotcom stocks during the second half of the 1990s. As prices kept rising, quarter after quarter, his options expired worthless. In 1996, faced with horrific losses, he started falsifying performance reports, hoping that the crash would come soon. In January of 2000, only a few months before the crash, he could no longer hide his fraud and went out of business. To avoid jail, he fled to Austria in 2002, where he was finally arrested in 2007. 6 To see in what sense these models are fragile, consider the simple example in Conlon (2004) . Two agents sell an asset to each other back and forth. From one period to the next the price of the asset either doubles or falls to zero. Each agent's beliefs are constructed in such a way that, whenever an agent is buying, his subjective probability of the price doubling (conditional on his information) is 50%, so that she is indifferent between buying, selling, or doing nothing. A small change to the price growth rate or to the probabilities destroys the equilibrium.
revealing that nobody has sold, medium, revealing that maybe one type has sold and maybe not, or low, revealing that at least one type has sold. I show that, even with this minimal amount of noise, there is a region of the parameter space where bubbles of arbitrary duration arise. In this class of equilibria, agents wait the longest before selling if price growth is high, but sell immediately if it is low. If price growth is medium, they also wait for a while, but not as long as with high growth. Agents find this optimal because at all times, those who are not supposed to sell think that their type may have been first to observe the signal, in which case, selling preemptively would mean foregoing large gains. These first equilibria are built under the simplifying assumption that agents cannot reenter the market after selling. Later, I
drop this requirement, and analyze how results change if agents can buy and sell at will. This changes matters, because, with forbidden reentry, an agent who sells preemptively misses out on large gains if her type turns out to be first. But with allowed reentry, if she sees that her type was first, she can reenter the market and forego only a fraction of those gains.
Hence, the opportunity-cost argument that deters preemptive sales is weakened, and some of the first equilibria must be discarded because they are not "reentry-proof". Nevertheless, the reentry option does not change results qualitatively, since the opportunity cost associated with preemptive selling can still be large enough to generate arbitrarily long bubbles.
Finally, I let noise hide sales by 1 z ≥ types. In this case, strategies that condition actions only on the most recent price ratio are no longer optimal. This is partly because, with minimal noise, if an agent knows that her type is selling, this greatly increases chances that price growth will be low and the crash will happen next period. But as noise increases, sales by one type have a diminishing marginal impact on the probability that the bubble will burst, and thus, it becomes increasingly important for agents to infer how many other types could be selling. Thus, I construct a class of equilibria where agents sell if it has been at least a given number of periods since observing the signal and if the price history implies that up to z types could be out of the market by the end of the period. Strategies still satisfy a Markov property, since a single variable summarizes what the price history reveals about how many types could be out of the market. I numerically compute the payoffs a player obtains by following this strategy vs. deviating from it, and show that for some parameters this strategy is indeed optimal. Not surprisingly, as noise increases, the rate at which the price needs to grow in order to generate bubbles falls.
In sum, this paper takes models of bubbles one step further by providing microfoundations for assumptions that were previously exogenous, and by validating the conjecture that a model with noisy prices would generate robust bubbles even if prices responded to selling pressure at all times. Indeed, results largely confirm previous findings, since asymmetric information allows bubbles of arbitrary length to arise. The bubbles I present are less deterministic, in the sense that in all equilibria there is a range of possible bursting times, and the realizations of noise determine where in that range the bubble bursts, and how many types manage to sell before the crash. As in AB, in my model price movements may act as coordination devices that can be ignored or trigger sales, and thus, there are multiple equilibria that can serve as a theory of overreaction to news, and fads and fashions in technical analysis.
As mentioned above, many economists eschew the idea of bubbles precisely because of the theoretical weaknesses of existing models. While AB, Allen et al, Conlon, and others have made great progress towards addressing these concerns, some features of the models are still difficult to defend on theoretical grounds. Taking steps towards demonstrating that bubbles still arise without these features shall increase the acceptability of models of greater fool's bubbles and increase their application to a series of questions, such as optimal policy in the presence of bubbles, or the emergence of bubbles in markets besides the stock market, such as real estate and foreign exchange.
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The paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3, respectively, I describe the environment and define equilibrium. In section 4 I construct bubbles with minimal noise and in section 5 I allow noise to hide sales by more than one type. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Time is discrete and infinite with periods labeled , 1,0,1, . t = − … … There are two assets, a risky asset that trades at the price t p and a risk-free asset with gross return 1. There are two kinds of agents, rational and behavioral. The only role of behavioral agents is to fuel the risky asset's appreciation. Every period, they become more enthusiastic about prospective returns, and no matter how high the price gets, they continue to demand shares until they have bought up to their absorption capacity, which equals (0,1) κ ∈ shares.
Then, there is a unit mass of rational agents with discount factor for future utility given by 1/ . R They are risk neutral, and the positions they can take in the risky asset are limited by short sales constraints. Concretely, their positions range between a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0. At 0, t = rational agents are fully invested in the asset, i.e. holdings equal one. The model's ability to generate bubbles will depend on whether these agents keep holding the asset even after they learn that it is overvalued. 
After the crash, the price grows at the rate 1. R − In sum, for 0, t > the price process is given by 13 Several models could give rise to a formula of this kind. For example, supply could be the sum of a constant (capturing behavioral sales) plus sales by rational agents, and demand could be a downward sloping curve that shifts upward over time, by a factor at first equal to G (in expectation), then lower as rational agents sell. These assumptions would make the model more explicit, but also less tractable and less comparable with AB.
[ ]
( 
Within-period timing is as follows. At the start of period , t having observed previous
, and if t n ≥ the signal n, a type-n agent submits orders to buy/sell, or does nothing. Later in the period, once all agents have submitted their orders and t ε has been realized, t p is determined and orders are executed.
14 Having described the environment, a question that naturally arises is why, after emphasizing the need for rigorous microfoundations, the model includes behavioral agents.
The reason for this inclusion is that I have attempted to introduce noise and price responsiveness in a parsimonious way, making as few changes as possible in order to facilitate comparison with existing literature. That being said, the presence of behavioral traders is not absolutely necessary in order to generate bubbles, as the model can be modified in such a way that all agents optimize and bubbles still arise. Suppose, for instance, that rational traders get an endowment every period and invest it in the risky asset while they believe that it will keep appreciating. This would fuel price growth. Supply could be modeled as follows. Every period, a randomly chosen fraction of agents would experience a shock (representing unforeseen events that increase liquidity needs, such as medical emergencies) that forced them to sell. Individuals would know whether they themselves had been hit by the shock, but not the total fraction of agents also hit by the shock, and this fraction could vary randomly from period to period. Since sales may be mistaken for the 14 Agents in the model are thus submitting market orders, since they know that their orders will be executed, but they do not know exactly at what price. See Chapter 3 in Brunnermeier (2001) for a description of microstructure models and types of orders (market orders, limit orders, stop orders, etc). During the period of the crash there are so orders to sell that the execution price is far below the last price that agents saw. In these situations, which practitioners call fast markets, from the time an order is submitted until it is executed, the price may have skyrocketed or plummeted. While I assume that, in the crash period, all orders are executed at the post-crash price, nothing would qualitatively change if instead I followed AB and let some shares be sold at the pre-crash price and others at the post-crash price.
realization of the random shock, this model would give rise to same kind of uncertainty as the model with behavioral agents.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE), consisting of 
n t n t E V I + is well defined because we know that the value of holdings after the burst is the post-crash price. This gives us an expected terminal value, from which to iterate backwards. 16 In sum, the equilibrium strategy , , 1 , ( | )
, ,
subject to (2) and , 0 1.
Bubble Equilibria with Minimal Noise
In the presence of noisy prices, multiple equilibria are unavoidable, since a given price pattern can either trigger sales, or be ignored, and both of those responses are optimal for an individual agent, as long as others respond to that price pattern in the same way. For this reason, I will not attempt to characterize all the model's equilibria, and will instead focus on a series of examples that illustrate how bubbles arise.
I will begin, in subsection 4.1, by studying the case without noise, i.e. the case where prices reveal sales as soon as one type exits the market. Restricting attention to a particular class of strategies, I derive a parameter condition, namely that / G R is below a threshold , Γ that ensures that agents sell as soon as they observe the signal. 17 In subsection 4.2, maintaining / , G R < Γ so that there are no bubbles without noise, I raise ε so that noise 16 As will be shown later, I only consider strategies where, for any price history, agents sell a finite number of periods after observing the signal. This implies that there is a well-defined maximum-possible duration of the bubble. Thus, it is always possible to iterate backwards from that finite period in order to calculate V . We could also assume, as AB do, that there is an exogenous maximum duration of the bubble. 17 The fact that, even without noise, if / , G R > Γ agents do not sell immediately after getting the signal does not contradict AB. This is because, in discrete time, if all agents of the same type sell simultaneously, a positive measure 1/ N of agents can sell before the crash even if there is no noise. However, as will become clear later, as 1/ N shrinks, Γ does not, implying that as 1/ N approaches zero, the bubble would have to grow infinitely fast for agents not to sell immediately after the signal. may conceal sales of one type but not more. Then, price ratios can be high, revealing that nobody has sold, medium, revealing that maybe one type has sold and maybe not, or low, revealing that at least one type has sold. I show that this minimal amount of noise is enough for arbitrarily long bubbles to arise. While this result, at first, relies on the assumption that agents cannot reenter the market after selling, in subsection 4.3, I allow for reentry and show that, although some equilibria vanish, it is still possible to generate arbitrarily long bubbles that are "reentry-proof".
Before presenting the examples, I make two more assumptions about parameter values that will greatly simplify algebra. First, I assume that the sensitivity of prices to selling pressure α is strictly positive, so that prices reveal information, but small, so that 
λ ≈ a crash at 1 t + is so unlikely that our type-n agent would rather wait than sell.
20
19 Once rational agents see that sales have started, they are indifferent between selling and waiting, since they get the post-crash price in either case. I assume that, in this situation of indifference, agents sell. This is unimportant, however, since strict preference for selling can be easily induced, for example by letting some shares to be sold at the pre-crash price, and the rest at the post-crash price. 20 This reasoning implicitly assumes that * 1. . t n = Thus, she will find it optimal to deviate from (5) by selling at * 1
Note two things here. First, since the crash is bigger for longer bubbles, if (6) 
Introducing a Minimal Amount of Noise
Henceforth, I will maintain the restriction that / , G R < Γ which rules out bubbles without noise. In this subsection, I show that, if the amount of noise ε is increased and agents play strategies similar to (5), the model generates arbitrarily long bubbles, even if the amount of noise is minimal in the sense that it can hide sales by at most one type. In particular, I captures the idea that agents are at least as inclined to sell when they think that sales may have started as when they are sure that they have not. It is actually impossible to build an equilibrium with strategies as in (7) and * **.
τ τ < Proof of this claim is available upon request.
These strategies have a simple Markov structure, since behavior depends only on how long it has been since observing the signal, and on whether the most recent price ratio is high, medium, or low. Earlier price ratios do affect beliefs, and I take this into account when verifying that strategies are optimal. But fortunately, for appropriate parameter values, agents indeed find it best to follow (7) at all times in the life of the bubble, for any price history. To show this, it is useful to classify the situations in which agents may find themselves into four categories, and to prove one lemma for each category. Thus, in Lemma 2, I verify that type-n agents find it optimal to sell at * t n τ Preemptive sales may be tempting because, while one waits, there is often a good chance that an earlier type is selling and will precipitate a crash. In Lemma 3, I show that, despite this risk, agents are willing to wait if two conditions hold. The first condition says, roughly, that the bubble must grow quickly and that it is must be likely that, when one type sells, the price ratio will be intermediate rather than low. The second condition is that / d N should be small relative to , κ so that sales following medium price growth do not burst the bubble.
Lemma 3 If
( ) 
From here, note that if 1 j > the probability of a crash at 1 t + falls to /( 1) j π + , and their preference for waiting rather than selling preemptively is even stronger if 1. j > Finally, note that (9) see that, if they are second 0 ( 1 ) t n = − the bubble will burst next period for sure, and if they are first ( 0 t n = ) the bubble will burst with probability π . Selling is preferable if ( ** 2) ( ** 1) is the first medium price ratio after k consecutive high ratios (with {2, ,
is given by { , , } n k n − … , and thus the probability that the crash will not happen next period falls from (1 ) / 2
Inequality (10) does not apply to the special case with 1, n = since, in that case, type-1 agents know their type with certainty. Still, if ** 1, τ ≥ (10) guarantees that they want to sell at time 1 ** τ + .
Finally, note that if ** t n τ > + , type-n agents know for sure that at least two types (their own type n and type 1 n + ) will sell in the current period, guaranteeing a crash at 1.
Since, intuitively, agents should be more inclined to sell after medium than high prices, and since Lemma 3 already needs parameter restrictions to preclude preemptive sales after high prices, it is not surprising that more restrictions are needed to rule out preemptive sales after medium prices. Indeed Lemma 5 rules out such sales only if under which, even in that worst-case scenario, type-n agents choose to wait. 23 In the exceptional case where 1, n = type-n agents know that they were first to observe the signal, and thus (10) G R and π are such that (8) fails for ** 0, τ = it is still possible to obtain equilibria with ** 0, τ = as long as type-n agents sell at time 24 In addition, the expected size of the crash increases, since the equivalent of (10) for {2, 3, ,
Lemma 5 Suppose that
In appendix B, I show that type-n agents are most tempted to sell preemptively when 1, t n = − only agents of type 1 n − will sell at , t and the bubble will burst at 1 t + with probability π , and at 2 t + with probability 1 . π − Thus, in all of the 2 d + cases with 0 , t n < it would be a good idea to sell preemptively. Therefore, for waiting to be optimal, the expected payoff d W for the case 0 t n = must be so large that ( * 2) ( ** 1)
(1 )
W depends on / G R and on how long the bubble keeps growing after t . Potentially, this could be up to 1 d + periods. However, in expected value, the bubble will burst sooner than that, since every period from t to 1, t d + + there is a probability π that prices will be high and growth will continue, and a probability 1 π − that prices will be intermediate, trigger sales, and cause a crash. Taking this into account, d
W is given by
The crucial element of the proof is that, if
W grows exponentially as d
increases. This ensures that (11) will hold if d is big enough. To see this, note that the righthand-side of (11) is decreasing in ** τ . Thus, if (11) holds in the limit as ** τ approaches infinity, it also holds for lower ** τ . For large ** τ , (11) is approximated by given that (9) tends to hold when d and π are small, while (11) tends to hold in the opposite case. Nonetheless, Proposition 1 establishes that the inequalities are compatible. In fact, for parameters within a given region, bubbles arise for arbitrarily large values of * τ and ** τ .
Proposition 1
Suppose that π ∈(½,1), Proof Given that / , G R < Γ (8) and (10) τ ≥ Combining these inequalities, we get
The set of pairs ( / , )
G R π that satisfies (13) is not empty, given that Note that, while * τ can be arbitrarily large, this does not mean that the equilibria constructed above rely on the possibility that bubbles may last forever. There is always a well-defined maximum duration of the bubble, which is * 2 τ + periods. An exogenous maximum duration of the bubble τ could be added to the model, and would have no effect as long as it was greater than * 2. In sum, examples 1 and 2 suggest that noise greatly increases the model's ability to generate bubbles. With / G R < Γ , the only equilibrium in example 1 is one where agents sell as soon as they see the signal, whereas in example 2, even though noise can only hide sales by one type, bubbles of unbounded duration arise. ε ε − Attempts to generate bubbles in this fashion would fail, because type-n agents' decisions at time * 1, n τ + − would be governed by (6) instead of (9), and thus, * τ could only be zero. 
.
Like (11), (14) holds for all ** τ if it holds in the limit as ** τ approaches infinity, in which case it can be rewritten as
which, using (12), is equivalent to ( / ) 3, c p p = the bubble bursts at time 31.
Having followed this example, we could re-write in a more precise way as follows:
Letting ( ) L t be the most recent time that x was , z and letting Are agents willing to go along with this equilibrium? As before, it is necessary to verify that agents want to sell when (16) dictates that they should sell and that they want to wait when (16) says that they should wait.
[Describe algorithm.] The assumption that there is a minimal amount of noise makes the model more tractable, but is not particularly conducive to generating bubbles. As intuition suggests, adding more noise makes it easier to obtain bubble-equilibria, since examples suggest that the growth rate of bubble does not need to be as large as in the case with minimal noise. The bubbles presented in this paper are more robust than those in previous literature, since prices always depend on selling pressure, and the equilibria are robust to small changes in parameters.
From a normative standpoint, proponents of fundamentals-based models often argue that loosely formulated theories of bubbles are often invoked as justifications for various distortionary regulations. While this paper supports the plausibility of bubbles, it does not recommend regulating markets in order to preclude them. More research is needed to understand when and how bubbles are likely to arise and whether some form of regulation may improve efficiency in financial markets.
* n k τ − + , agents of type 0 t n k = − will sell, precipitating a crash in the next period with probability .
π Finally, if 0 , t n = nobody sells before type n, and type-n agents will reap appreciation gains for up to j periods. Thus, for general values of j, j θ is given by ( )
yield an expected payoff 1 1 j θ − > , where, as in the proof of lemma 3, j θ denotes the expected discounted payoff that a type-n agent obtains if she follows (7) at all times. However, even though selling preemptively and reentering is preferable to selling preemptively without the option to reenter, it is still better to not sell preemptively in the first place. To see this, note that j θ exceeds the payoff from exiting and reentering if 
